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The focus of this article is on the notion that, whether in forgiveness or non-forgiveness, 
negative moral emotions towards a wrongdoer may remain extant and continue to generate 
memories of wrongdoing. This constitutes a kind of objection to the wrongdoing, even a 
sort of protest against it insofar as the wrongdoing seems to undermine the victim’s sense 
of worth. I argue that certain non-retributive attitudes or emotions play under-appreciated 
roles in policing the boundaries of victims’ self-respect and I attempt to explain what makes 
such attitudes or emotions – those that reflect the deepest concerns of victims of wrongdoing 
– centrally important. I defend the need for diverse responses that better fit the nuanced 
reactions amongst those who seek to come to terms with their hurt, especially those choosing 
not to forgive. Whatever stance is adopted, protecting one’s self-respect remains the core 
value that victims of wrongdoing seek to defend.
Introduction
Although many researchers focus on the advantages of forgiveness, only a few examine its 
negative or problematic features. In this article I shall argue that sometimes granting forgiveness 
to a wrongdoer may be morally questionable and may even be morally wrong. My purpose is to 
show that not forgiving can be as moral and beneficial in some situations as forgiving can be in 
others (Safer 1999). Drawing upon suggestions in recent forgiveness literature, I try to show that 
the existence of dissenting views concerning offences may in fact pave the way for such a stance: 
one which permits the victim to retain self-respect whilst excluding retributive motives. 
My approach is as follows. In the first section I explore some of the issues occasioned by sentiment-
based views of forgiveness to which my own variant belongs. My purpose is to introduce non-
forgiveness as an intermediate position between forgiveness and unforgiveness (the retention 
of resentment and other retributive feelings in response to wrongdoing). I argue that certain 
non-retributive attitudes or emotions play under-appreciated roles in policing the boundaries of 
a victim’s self-respect and attempt to explain what makes such attitudes or emotions – those that 
reflect the deepest concerns of victims of wrongdoing – centrally important. In the final two sections 
I examine how the victim’s self-respect is implicated in diverse responses to wrongdoing. 
Non-retributive non-forgiveness as a variant of 
sentiment-based responses to wrongdoing 
The dominant view of forgiveness in the philosophical literature conceives it as the successful 
overcoming or setting aside of negative emotions – resentment and other retributive emotions 
with similar features – that are naturally directed towards a wrongdoer because of the 
wrongdoing (e.g., Allais 2008; Griswold 2007). I accept that forgiveness is the overcoming of 
retributive reactive attitudes, which include resentment and indignation, as well as other possible 
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attitudes such as anger, malice, suspicion and contempt. 
However, the philosophical literature has tended to advocate 
what Lamb (2006:45) calls ‘a hyper individualized notion of 
personal harm’, suggesting that forgiveness cannot involve 
third parties (e.g., MacLachlan 2009; Pettigrove 2004; Radzik 
2011). MacLachlan (2009) joins Lamb (2006) in pointing out 
that such an approach overlooks: 
... both the role of group identities and identifications in situations 
of trauma and harms ignoring the often fragmented and multiple 
nature of our identities, as well as the ways in which we are 
always selves-in-relation to one another. (MacLachlan 2009:7) 
She points out that whilst it may be conceptually tidy 
to describe scenarios of forgiveness as singular, isolated 
incidents, complete with a single, easily identifiable (and 
morally uncomplicated) ‘victim’ and ‘wrongdoer’, these 
paradigms bear very little resemblance to most actual 
situations in which we are called upon to forgive or be 
forgiven. If we treat ‘hyper individualized’ paradigms as 
normative frameworks for evaluating our more complicated 
moral experiences, we risk distorting the particularities of our 
moral reality. This is a view I endorse in seeking to explicate 
a more nuanced understanding of the relational aspects of 
responses to wrongdoing on the part of the many and varied 
parties concerned with it. 
In contrast to the dominant position of overcoming retributive 
attitudes and emotions, a different sentiment-based account 
may hold, with Walker (2006:154–155), that there are many 
negative feelings that are ‘likely to occur instead of or 
alongside angry ones’, and that overcoming these can in 
some instances constitute forgiveness. According to Blustein 
(2010:589), sentiment-based accounts are characterised by 
the contention that forgiveness consists in a change of heart 
towards the offender, a change that does not leave resentment 
and other retributive feelings dominant.
How do we respond emotionally to being wrongfully harmed? 
Prima facie [at first sight], we are likely to experience emotions 
such as resentment, indignation and nuanced variants of 
these – hostile responses to being unjustifiably harmed. 
However, according to Walker (2006), the emotions that 
wrongdoing provokes are much more diverse than this: 
Aside from anger, resentment, contempt, indignation, wrath, 
rage, hatred, scorn and vengefulness, being harmed wrongly 
can cause disappointment, hurt, heartbreak, sadness, despair, 
pessimism, mistrust, helplessness, and hopelessness; also disgust, 
anguish, shame, guilt, humiliation, fear, or terror. (p. 155)
This catalogue might appear to be a veritable potpourri of 
divergent attitudes and sentiments and certainly in need 
of justification. Forgiveness, it might be argued, involves 
overcoming or foreswearing only certain negative emotional 
responses to wrongdoing, those that are moral in nature – 
whereas some of the emotions on Walker’s list, like sadness 
and disappointment, do not seem to be of this sort. Blustein 
(2010:591) offers a clever way around this tricky issue. 
He suggests that the negative emotions that play a role in 
forgiveness are moral in the sense that they are partially 
constituted by the belief that one has been wrongfully 
harmed or done an unjustified and non-excused injury, and 
resentment is generally regarded as the central case. Ceteris 
paribus [all other things being unchanged or constant], 
should I be described as feeling disappointed at the betrayal 
of trust, this would count as a moral emotion because my 
friend would be justified in experiencing guilt or shame, 
for instance. So there seems to be no reason in principle 
to limit forgiveness to the overcoming or foreswearing of 
emotions of moral anger (Hughes 1997). Even repressing 
or successfully extinguishing retributive feelings might be 
insufficient to justify speaking of forgiveness if substantive 
feelings of ‘disappointment, hurt, heartbreak, sadness’ (to 
select arbitrarily from Walker’s (2006) catalogue) remain.
However, as Blustein (2010) points out, it is also possible for 
some of the emotions on Walker’s list to surface or remain after 
forgiveness has been achieved (and not merely as a kind of 
emotional residue without moral meaning), but – like negative 
emotions present before forgiveness – partially constituted 
by the belief that one has been wrongfully harmed:
Forgiveness need not, and commonly does not, wipe the 
emotional slate clean, eliminating all negative moral emotions. 
I can forgive you for your rudeness and continue to be hurt and 
saddened by your insensitivity; I can get over my anger at you 
for your insulting behaviour but nevertheless remain cautious 
and somewhat mistrustful of you because of it. (p. 592)
Now standard accounts tell us that forgiveness cannot have 
been achieved if resentment and other emotions of moral 
anger persist and no effort is made to moderate them. But 
if, following Walker, we can have cases in which it is some 
negative non-retributive emotion that has to be overcome 
for forgiveness to be achieved, this effectively blurs the 
distinction between the before and the after of forgiveness 
in terms of the emotions involved. Blustein (2010:592) 
suggests that there can be disappointment and hurt before 
forgiveness that impede the ability to forgive and that they 
can also remain after efforts at merely overcoming the 
harsher retributive sentiments have been successful. This 
raises the question of what the difference between pre- and 
post-forgiveness consists in when the same sorts of emotions 
are involved in both. These are problems that standard 
sentiment-based accounts of forgiveness do not have to deal 
with, since they draw a fairly sharp dividing line between the 
negative emotions that forgiveness overcomes and whatever 
emotions remain after forgiveness has been achieved.
A way of approaching this impasse, I suggest, is to adopt 
the stance of non-retributive non-forgiveness. In offering my 
own variant of sentiment-based accounts, I want to show that 
a victim can regain their damaged self-respect and identity 
without forgiving their wrongdoer, contrary to the orthodoxy 
of those who valorise forgiveness. So as to clarify the position 
that I am opposing, consider an earlier view of Holmgren 
(1993). In the course of her portrayal of the attitudes of 
the unconditional forgiver whose forgiveness does not 
compromise his/her self-respect, she claims that, whether 
the wrongdoer repents or not, the victim who reaches a state 
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of genuine forgiveness exhibits a strong level of self-respect. 
He/she is secure in his/her knowledge of his/her own 
worth and he/she does not allow herself/himself to be held 
in the grip of the wrongdoer’s false opinion. Instead, he/she 
has the maturity to recognise the wrongdoer’s confusion for 
what it is and to put it in proper perspective (ibid:346). This 
idealised description of the victim’s capacity to retain his/her 
self-respect is at odds with much of the more recent literature 
on the topic, as I shall try to show in my final sections.1 
Of course, negative emotions tend to lead towards inaccurate 
judgements, lessened concern for the other parties’ preferences, 
and neglect of one’s own instrumental goals. Feelings that 
may dissuade a victim from forgiving include distrust, 
anger, fear, contempt, embarrassment, shame, pride and 
disappointment. In many instances, these same negative 
emotions inhibit communication during mediation and make 
it difficult for parties to engage in constructive discussion 
(Shapiro 2002:72). On the other hand, non-forgiveness of 
whatever kind requires renewed focus upon a person’s self-
respect. The harmed person can begin to live a better life as 
a result of actions and associations with good people in the 
human community, coming to see themselves as like them: a 
person who can care about others who are harmed, including 
themselves. When they receive the support of those who did 
not wrong or harm them, they learn that there is respect for 
themselves as persons, and not merely by virtue of them as 
victims. Learning to do this involves forging relationships 
with others as part of the process which enables them 
to transcend some of the limitations of victimhood. This 
provides a sound basis for the harmed person to live a good 
life, whilst strengthening communities through the fullest 
participation of people in their lives. 
The centrality of various non-
retributive emotions in relation to 
self-respect
It is a fact of human psychology that feelings of anger and 
resentment – feelings that often characterise a victim’s 
immediate response to being harmed – tend to cool and 
may gradually subside even if the offender has not been 
forgiven. This is probably a reason for connecting forgiving 
with forgetting. However, non-forgiveness in the manner 
described implies that we no longer need to hold grudges – 
we declare our independence of victimhood. Therapeutically 
speaking, it signifies breaking the cycle of pain and abuse, 
giving up the belief that the other person should hurt as 
much as we do, whilst discounting any further relationship 
with them. Nevertheless, I have argued, non-forgiveness is 
compatible with retaining a range of robust non-retributive 
negative feelings and attitudes towards the wrongdoer. 
The victim can, and often should, retain these feelings and 
attitudes in order to stand up for themselves and retain 
their self-respect. 
1.I follow Dillon (1997:228) in her view that self-respect is not a discrete entity but is 
rather a complex of multiple-layered and inter-penetrating phenomena involving an 
emotionally charged interplay of self, others and institutions that begins long before 
we are capable of conceptualising relationships amongst them.
In contrast, there is widespread disagreement about precisely 
which feelings need to be overcome for forgiveness to take 
place. Everyone agrees that certain hostile feelings – such 
as resentment and indignation – are incompatible with 
forgiveness, but many (e.g., Murphy 1988; Roberts 1995) accept 
that the suggestion that all negative feelings must be overcome 
is too strong. For example, my continued disappointment that I 
have been betrayed by my best friend does not by itself show 
that I have not forgiven him. If, pace [with due deference] 
Blustein and many others, forgiveness does not entirely wipe 
the slate clean, feeling disappointed is compatible both with 
forgiveness and with non-forgiveness. What seems to have 
been missed is the central role that certain non-retributive 
emotions play in alternative responses to wrongdoing. 
If I am disappointed in or disapprove of what you have 
done, I need not have any desire that you suffer harm for 
it. Hampton (1988) claims that negative moral emotions 
towards the perpetrator of the wrong may linger and may 
animate memories of wrongdoing, and when they do so, 
the emotions constitute a sort of continuing protest against 
or rejection of the diminution implied by that wrongdoing.2 
This implies those negative emotions that are different from 
the retributive emotions generally attending the perception 
of being wronged play a role that has been insufficiently 
appreciated in both the forgiveness process and the 
post-forgiveness relations. Such negative non-retributive 
emotions often surface or linger after forgiveness has been 
achieved. I do not want to discount the regressive potential 
of such emotions in turning acts of forgiveness around. There 
is a need to acknowledge the danger that experiencing such 
emotions may be the occasion for recidivism by reviving and 
re-igniting the very retributive moral sentiments that the 
wrongdoing originally elicited. However, precisely because 
of such real dangers, the role of non-retributive emotions 
tends to be more peripheral in accounts of forgiveness. 
Consequently, philosophical accounts of such attitudes and 
emotions tend to under-moralise them. By under-moralising 
the content of these expressions of moral protest they have 
risked overlooking or covering over their ethical significance. 
Consider that, pace Blustein (2010) and Murphy (2003:19), 
hurt is a response that – at least potentially – deserves our 
moral attention as ‘emotional testimony’ to our moral 
values. Other attitudes can be taken seriously, insofar as they 
resemble this: that is, insofar as they protest the injury as an 
attack on their self-respect. 
Blustein (2010:595) argues that the expression of such emotions 
as sadness, disappointment or grief over having been harmed 
by someone I trusted, for example, or the shame I might feel 
for having been so trusting of them – no less than my anger at 
them for this harm – can be a way of drawing moral attention 
to the harm. For Blustein such sentiments reveal the contours 
and importance of my sense of self-worth – the insistence 
2.The protest need not come only from the victim, but also from the larger moral 
community. By the same token, as I argued above, it is possible to have a range of 
diverse responses over time to the wrongdoing by ‘moral bystanders’ – some forgiving 
– or, equally importantly, to refusing to forgive in a sense of solidarity with others 
in the same situation (see also MacLachlan 2009; Pettigrove 2004; Radzik 2011). 
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on my right to respect. Communicating these emotions 
may have the effect of showing that one holds the offender 
responsible and blameworthy for what the person has done. 
In our different reactions to wrongdoing we reveal where the 
boundaries of our self-regard lie. They are different ways of 
pointing out to the offender that one holds their wrongdoing 
against them and that one will not merely gloss over acts 
that imply the diminishment of what one has the right to 
expect from them.
The point made here is that non-retributive negative emotions 
can (but need not always) function as distressed expressions 
of moral disapproval of how one has been treated. They reflect 
upon the offender for being the author of that treatment and 
it is as expressions of such disapproval that they serve to 
define and police the boundaries of one’s self-respect.
However, drawing such boundaries may also be equivocal. 
Richards (1988) points out that:
... [i]t is possible for mistreatment to make one not angry or 
contemptuous but just very sad, if it is mistreatment at the hands 
of a loved one. Imagine, for example, that your grown son had 
badly let you down. This might make you angry, of course, but 
it might also make you feel deeply disappointed in him, instead. 
You are hurt that he should act in this way, not angry, not moved 
to hatred. (p. 78)
Contra Richards (1988), it may be that non-retributive negative 
emotions need not be overcome in order to forgive, although 
this may be a matter of the severity of such emotions. If I am 
so sad about the behaviour of my son that it hampers my 
relationship with him, I may need to overcome this sadness 
through forgiveness. However, if I am less saddened, this 
may be compatible with non-forgiveness and maintaining 
modified relations with him – a fact that by itself may give 
him pause for thought. Such considerations point towards 
the openness of interpersonal relationships and incline 
one towards thinking that neither forgiveness nor non-
forgiveness can ever be prescribed. Nevertheless, despite the 
diversity of moral considerations, a core value – self-respect 
– may be found to underlie interpersonal relations – or, at 
least, so I hope to show.
Self-respect and diverse responses 
to wrongdoing
In turning now to the defence of self-respect in the different 
responses to wrongdoing, I want to argue that sometimes 
granting forgiveness to a wrongdoer may be morally 
questionable and may even be morally wrong. Of course, 
as Murphy (1988:33) points out, forgiveness is not always in 
my power: I can resolve and try the best I can to overcome 
resentment, but I will sometimes fail. Ought I to be blamed 
for this? Murphy insists that genuine forgiveness, if it is to 
be a moral virtue, must be based on moral reasons and so, it 
would seem, it must be a matter of choice. And yet, most of 
the time, we believe that we cannot choose what we feel – at 
least not directly, and perhaps not even indirectly.
We cannot make ourselves love someone because we think 
we ought to. Can we make ourselves forgive someone because 
we think they have separated themselves from their wrongful 
deed through, for instance, repenting? If not, harbouring 
resentment and even seeking revenge may require greater 
understanding than they are often accorded.3 Whilst it is 
not my intention to explore all possible positions on these 
matters, I want to argue that the existence of dissenting 
views concerning offences may in fact pave the way for such 
a stance: one which permits the victim to retain self-respect 
whilst not countenancing retributive steps that may lead to 
spiralling conflict. 
In everyday life, transgressions cannot be avoided. Whilst 
relating with one another, we step on one another’s toes. 
Relationships have the power to hurt as well as to enrich. 
There are many ways in every culture and society in which 
people easily excuse themselves from less serious offences. 
However, serious ones are rather different. For an offender, 
to acknowledge having caused harm and to repent is the 
usual precondition for forgiveness. On the other hand, 
responding as a victim of wrongdoing can take several 
different forms. Offended victims themselves may not need 
to wait to be approached in this way – they may take the 
initiative and approach the offender, holding out an olive 
branch. Of course, if the offence is particularly threatening 
to the victim’s self-respect, they may seek other remedies, 
such as the rather regrettable if natural tit-for-tat response of 
retaliation. What needs to be borne in mind is the undoubted 
fact that it is indeed necessary for the victim to repudiate 
the offender’s message that they do not count sufficiently 
for them to exercise proper restraint in their dealings. For 
Murphy (2003), the values of self-respect, self-defence and 
respect for the moral order are ‘defended by resentment and 
threatened by hasty and uncritical forgiveness’. Resentment 
is a way to ‘repudiate the message’ (ibid:77) that the victim 
does not count as much as the offender and is consistent with 
some form of punishment. Murphy’s (ibid:19) view ‘takes the 
past very seriously and makes some of its evil irrevocable in 
human terms’ (his emphasis). 
In line with Murphy’s (2003) view I accept that resentment 
is a negative feeling that the victim of a wrongdoing has 
towards an agent for harming them, that is, for committing 
culpable wrongdoing that the victim takes to have been 
directed against them. If the harm appears to be unintentional 
– or at least not done with ill-will – the victim does not feel 
resentment. Rather, they feel resentment when they take 
the harm to have been done without proper concern for 
their well-being, making the harm a wrong. In this way, the 
wrong constitutes harm on two counts: it is an injury and it 
is an insult to the victim, for it appears to the victim that the 
wrongdoer does not respect them appropriately (Murphy 
1988:25). It is this insult that might lead the victim to view 
the wrongdoer’s action as an assault on their self-respect. The 
3.Even revenge has recently received qualified support. Rosebury (2008) claims that 
revenge is deserving of rational respect based on its standing outside morality as 
a choice by the revenger not to act morally but to obey other compelling motives.
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salient point is that: ‘... [t]he self-respecting person thus also 
holds herself (though not others) to certain personal standards 
and expectations, the disappointment of which she would 
regard as a degrading self-betrayal’. (Dillon 1997:230)
Elsewhere (Ally 2005), I have defended the view that self-
respect has as its main feature that it requires a person to 
retain a susceptibility to feelings of shame when such feelings 
are appropriate. Here I would add a second significant 
feature: that it requires of a person that they respond – 
typically with a variety of negative reactive attitudes – to 
actions that are disrespectful of them. Resentment usually 
performs such a function, but other responses such as 
indignation may be even more appropriate. It may even be 
the case that upon reflection one comes to see a disrespectful 
act as a way of curbing one’s unacknowledged hubris and – 
imbued with the appropriate desire for self-improvement – 
overlook such an act. However, mutatis mutandis, someone 
who continues to endure insulting behaviour must be seen 
as lacking in appropriate self-respect, as indeed would 
someone who refused to accept responsibility for any hint 
of shame, as though they could always be entirely blameless 
(Taylor 1985:77–78).
To have and to retain self-respect is to remain susceptible 
to feelings of shame: knowing when these feelings are 
acceptable and then to own them. But in connecting such 
feelings to a ‘way of being whose core is a deep appreciation 
of one’s morally significant worth’ (Dillon 1997:228), the self-
respecting person regards certain forms of thinking, feeling, 
desiring, and acting as befitting persons, and regards other 
forms as degrading, and they expect themselves (and other 
persons) to adhere to the former and avoid the latter. This 
is often seen as the hallmark of dignity, or self-worth in the 
sense that self-respect and dignity coincide precisely where 
we have accepted the reality of shame and yet been prepared 
to dissolve its most toxic effects in all manner of ways that 
accord us a sense of worth (Turner 1995:1072).
Forgiveness, self-respect and the 
respect of others
Failing to stand up for oneself is likely to decrease one’s 
respect for oneself and one’s sense of certainty about oneself 
and one’s values. Forgiving too easily (with insufficient 
serious engagement with the wrongdoer concerning the 
damage they have wrought) practically always diminishes 
one’s self-respect (Luchies et al. 2010). On the other hand, 
it is possible for forgiving to enhance one’s self-respect. It 
may be thought that merely by repenting and requesting 
forgiveness a wrongdoer deserves to be forgiven. Certainly, 
in such instances, it is possible for forgiving to enhance one’s 
self-respect. But what if the wrongdoer is unrepentant? Does 
this not render forgiveness inappropriate? My answer is 
to agree with those who answer not necessarily. Instead of 
waiting, perhaps fruitlessly, for an apology, the victim may 
respond quite differently. They may withhold forgiveness if 
it is sought or grant forgiveness even if it is not!
Let me explain. The function of forgiveness preserving self-
respect may derive from a number of sources. It may derive 
from a sort of stoicism wherein one rises above the travails 
of everyday life, refusing to allow them to hold one’s actions 
and attitudes hostage (Pettigrove 2004:198). This is especially 
pertinent when the victim of wrongdoing has to determine 
their response in the face of an unrepentant wrongdoer. 
Pettigrove maintains that self-respect may derive from the 
perceived nobility of forgiving the wrongdoer, from one’s 
pride in manifesting what one takes to be a virtue. Moreover, 
he argues, it may also be affirmed by the forgiver’s community 
to the extent that people see the victim’s forgiveness of the 
unrepentant wrongdoer as a sign of moral strength. In each 
of these ways forgiving the unrepentant can enhance rather 
than diminish one’s self-respect. If Pettigrove’s analysis is 
correct, then punishment, apology and forgiveness would 
all seem to function in ways that can block any suggestion 
of implicit condonation of the unrepentant wrongdoer 
and sustain the victim’s self-respect. They each uphold a 
moral standard and condemn the actions of the wrongdoer 
as a violation of that standard, whilst being open to re-
negotiating relations with him. They each possess qualities 
that can preserve the victim’s self-respect even when it has 
been challenged by the wrongdoer’s misdeeds. And each can 
function to reduce resentment’s hold upon the victim’s life.
But what can now be said of non-forgiveness? One reason for 
introducing this alternative is that the polarities forgiveness 
and unforgiveness fail to reflect the complexities of human 
relationships where people and their actions may carry 
multiple messages and inflict more than one kind of damage 
at more than one level. Should the victim not be willing to 
engage the wrongdoer because of the continued presence of 
certain residual attitudes and emotions, there ought to be no 
overriding pressures to be brought upon him/her to adopt 
any specific stance. But even apart from this, third-party 
witnesses in the form of relatives or community members 
who are indirectly harmed through their association with 
a victim may respond in one or other manner indicated. 
Uniformity of attitude is by no means to be expected on 
account of such association.
Whether we think that possessing self-respect is a core value 
or not will depend on whether we think it is always justified 
to defend it. If we think a person behaves in the way that 
objective standards demand, and is not merely complacent, 
we approve of their having the appropriate attitude. Self-
respect is not self-sufficient. It depends on the respectful 
attitudes of others, or at least on behaviour by others that 
implies such attitudes towards us. This is why being treated 
disrespectfully by others undermines our self-respect. No 
one will dispute that, as a general proposition, the attitudes of 
others must enter crucially into my self-conception in many 
instances (Bird 2004:17). How I think and feel about myself 
will often depend on how others express their thoughts and 
feelings about me: were this not the case, our relationships 
with friends, lovers, spouses, parents and mentors would lack 
their characteristic psychological tension. Moreover, as is 
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v79i1.2113http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 6 of 8
now widely recognised, practical reflection and evaluation 
are inherently social or public.
Given this, our sense of our worth will inevitably reflect the 
social routines that inform and often partly constitute our 
roles, commitments and personal aspirations. Since those 
routines include behaviour that is publicly understood to 
express various attitudes towards us, self-assessment and 
the assessment of others are bound to be linked in a myriad 
ways. Sustaining the very particular attitudes to oneself 
that constitute self-respect requires distinctively respectful 
treatment from others. Very often our self-conceptions 
depend on others’ attitudes towards us. After all, one could 
maintain that self-respect has a variety of necessary social 
preconditions – yet insist that the respect of others is not 
amongst them. Contrary to this, Rawls (1971:440) claimed that 
even under ideal conditions, in which everyone is assumed 
to have had a perfectly healthy and loving upbringing, the 
continuing reassurance of respect from others is still required 
for agents to maintain their self-respect. On this view, our self-
respect remains vulnerable to others’ disrespect throughout 
our lives, even under circumstances that are otherwise 
ideal. Does the respectful or disrespectful behaviour of others 
ever provide reasons for agents to respect or to lose respect 
for themselves?
Margalit thinks it does. He contends that:
... [a]lthough self-respect is an attitude you may have toward 
yourself, it depends on the attitudes of others toward you. This 
dependence is not merely causal ... [it] is conceptual as well. 
(Margalit 1994:124)
When, according to Margalit (1994), do the conduct and 
attitudes of others pose a threat to our self-respect? They 
do so, he claims, when they involve humiliation and hence 
disrespect. Thus he defines a ‘decent’ society as one in which 
major social institutions do not humiliate its members and a 
‘civilised’ society as one whose members do not humiliate 
each other. Margalit (ibid:120) understands humiliation as 
a form of disrespect for humans that supplies ‘victims with 
a sound reason for viewing their self-respect as having 
been injured’. Given this construal of humiliation, Margalit 
naturally concludes that decent and civilised societies are the 
only ones that can fully preserve their members’ self-respect. 
Societies that are in various ways indecent or uncivilised 
necessarily threaten their members’ self-respect by tolerating, 
and in extreme cases encouraging, acts of humiliation. 
In the light of the foregoing, it would seem that forgiveness 
may not only be inappropriate – it might sometimes 
even be harmful to one’s self-respect. Consider that in the 
aftermath of genocide it may seem quite ghastly to advocate 
forgiveness of specific wrongdoers. Only those who have 
suffered atrocities are entitled to grant forgiveness – when 
they are dead, no one is entitled to do it for them (Pettigrove 
2009:583). But suffering, insult and humiliation go beyond 
the immediate victims. Sooner or later it falls to the survivors 
and secondary victims to face the problems of co-existence 
or enduring enmity (Tück 2004:528). Should they choose to 
forgive, they would do so not for the sake of the murdered, 
but for their own. They forgive their own pain, trauma and 
loss, and shape their new future (Szablowinski 2010:477). 
Alternatively, should these choose not to forgive, are they 
diminished by an unforgiving attitude? 
In this article I have argued that a victim can regain self-
esteem and identity without forgiving the wrongdoer, 
contrary to the orthodoxy of those who valorise forgiveness. 
Forgiveness and non-forgiveness are not opposites; they 
are points along a continuum, and there are many points 
in between (Safer 1999:183). The argument is that when 
genuine forgiveness is impossible – because the injury is too 
great or the offender will not apologise – a better response 
than resentment is to accept or to work through the injury. 
This healing process ought to lead to emotional resolution 
and the ability to move on with one’s life. One could ask if 
it would be appropriate to forgive any repentant wrongdoer 
without taking into consideration the character and extent of 
the wrong committed. If an act of forgiveness in the wake 
of genocide might be demeaning to the victim and related 
others, it would be understandable not to forgive. Therefore, 
it is evident that, if victims have suffered extreme humiliation, 
it may be hard to expect them to forgive even a repentant 
wrongdoer (Szablowinski 2010:473). The burden of the past 
wrong may simply be so big that the victim cannot foreswear 
it without losing moral dignity. Moral dignity is a category 
of value that is specific to individuals, makes individuals 
inviolable, puts them ‘above all price,’ and entitles its 
bearers to equal standing in a community of equals (Kant 
[1788] 1998:42–43). Such a community is regulated by moral 
norms to which all members, as free and rational agents, are 
accountable. These moral norms express and give substance 
to the equal dignity of persons, and dictate how they must 
address and treat one another, what they may properly exact 
from one another, and what they owe to one another.
Unforgiveness means either doing nothing about the hurt or 
trying to punish the perpetrator in any way possible. Anger 
and bitterness caused by the evil deed will occasionally trigger 
an emotional response, making the condition of the victim 
worse. The chain of violence and hatred is strengthened 
and is usually passed on to the next generation. The victims 
remain victims for life.
Forgiveness, in turn, is difficult and takes time, especially 
when both decisional forgiveness and emotional forgiveness 
are at stake. When genuine, it has the power to heal and stop 
violence. Although it does not remove all pain, it makes 
whatever pain which remains bearable. Survivors are able to 
restore their relationships and go on with their lives.
However, non-forgiveness implies continuing to experience 
both hard negative feelings (retributive non-forgiveness) as 
well as merely ‘soft’ ones (non-retributive non-forgiveness). 
Given the different manners in which people may be victims 
(primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.) it seems reasonable that 
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different responses for different victims of wrongdoing are 
called for, particularly in cases in which pain and humiliation 
have been inflicted. In her finely nuanced article, Townley 
(2011) suggests that the moral work of responding to 
wrongdoing is not just to forgo anger, but to reconfigure – 
not just repair – our moral communities. Her pluralism in 
this regard requires some of us to change commitments (and 
even to betray them); it sometimes requires us to forgive, and 
sometimes to withhold forgiveness, but it does not always 
require everyone to take the same stance with respect to a 
given instance of wrongdoing (Townley 2011:78). Diverse 
forgiveness stances can be better, more justified, than uniform 
forgiveness or refusal to forgive. Discussions about the moral 
value of unconditional forgiveness or whether forgivingness 
(i.e. the virtue associated with forgiveness – Roberts 1995) 
should always be commended seem problematic because 
they seem to be underpinned by a kind of invariance. 
Whether or not forgiveness is justified may depend greatly on 
circumstance and context. Forgiveness might lead not only to 
increased goodwill but also perhaps to trust, which might be 
unwise, and expose one’s vulnerability. Moreover, it might 
undermine solidarity with others in needful opposition to 
wrongdoing. It might be a good thing that some people’s 
readiness to forgive is balanced by others’ resistance, refusal 
or reluctance to forgive (Townley 2011:76).
Conclusion
Emotional responses to perceived wrongs justify different 
responses. Staying calm and emotionless in the face of 
serious wrongdoing seems more vicious than virtuous since 
such a response misses a sense of the importance of what has 
happened and its significance to the people affected. Our 
emotions aim at restoring the victim to the community and 
creating a sense of meaning in the events. When inflicting 
harm upon victims, offenders effectively convey a message 
that they are superior to the victims because they can do such 
things without feeling the need to restrain themselves. As a 
means of effecting moral repair (especially to their self-respect) 
those offended are morally mandated to demand justice. 
Although forgiveness is one of several ways to overcome a 
past wrong, it is not the only ethical response to wrong and 
evil deeds. To demand forgiveness as the only possible way 
may often have worse moral outcomes and violate more 
ethical principles (e.g. respect for human dignity, freedom 
and responsibility) than retaining feelings of resentment 
towards wrongdoers. Of course, choosing to forgive brings 
about a change in the victim’s emotional responses to 
wrongdoing. It is likely that angry and embittered responses 
to human rights violations, for example, may be overcome 
if wrongdoers are forgiven. Likewise, non-retributive 
emotions will remain, especially if they are not eliminated 
by forgiveness; but with time even memories of hurt fade 
unless deliberately cultivated.
When forgiveness is granted, it does not mean that the evil 
deeds are excused (treated as if they had a sufficient explanation 
for being committed), condoned (accepted as wrong but still 
being within the margin of tolerance) or forgotten (wiped out 
from the memory), as many supporters of unforgivability seem 
to fear. Forgiveness deals with the issue of how the deeds will 
be remembered: without feelings of hatred and resentment. 
Likewise, I have argued that non-forgiveness is not the 
opposite of forgiveness. It may (in one of its forms) share with 
forgiveness the presence of certain non-retributive attitudes 
or emotions that play different roles in circumscribing the 
boundaries of victims’ self-respect.
Victims and bystanders experience a number of emotions 
in the aftermath of conflict: grief, sorrow, hurt, shock – as 
well as disappointment, anguish, mistrust, despair. With 
renewed focus upon the affective dimensions of wrongdoing, 
philosophers have begun revaluing reactive attitudes, both 
retributive and non-retributive. Indeed, if the better-known 
retributive reactive attitudes are important indicators of self-
respect, the lesser-known non-retributive ones also deserve 
appropriate acknowledgment for their roles in defence of it. 
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